

Airports in Durham Region ..(read time 9 min.)

About This Submission

Durham Council, over an extended period of time, has been given false and misleading information regarding airports. The information has been provided by the GTAA, Transport Canada, and various encumbered “experts.” (Appendix various see 7 of this submission)

Pickering Airport an Economic Driver?

Durham Regional Council has repeatedly confirmed a need for a Pickering airport in Durham as an acceptable driver for growth. Durham believes and declares that airports are substantial growth generators with positive cost-benefit potential.

Transport Canada owns the Pickering Lands and holds them in case of need for a future airport project. But Transport Canada is contractually constrained within Article 44 of its Ground Lease with the Greater Toronto Airports Authority (GTAA). A Pickering Airport cannot proceed until Toronto Pearson International Airport is no longer “**meeting any capacity and demand requirements.**” (Appendix 1)

The GTAA’s current Master Plan (2017-2037) foresees no existing or projected capacity issues within the Plan’s timeframe. (Appendix 2)

The Minister of Transport has agreed with this assessment. (Appendix 3)

The practical and absolute capacity limits declared for a 5-runway or a planned 6-runway system in the GTAA’s 2008 Master Plan were expected to be reached between 2013 and 2023, but such references were not included in the 2017 Master Plan, (Appendix 4) and were false from conception. (Appendix p.42) **The two master plans clearly define the term “capacity” as used in the Ground Lease contract, quoted above.** The GTAA has stated in its 2017 Master Plan that these limits will not be reached before that Plan’s termination date of 2037. (Appendix 2)

Two major reports commissioned by Transport Canada to analyze Southern Ontario airport capacity – the Needs Assessment Study: Pickering Lands, dated 2010 and released in 2011 (Appendix 5) and the KPMG Supply and Demand Report, dated 2016 and released in 2020 (Appendix 6) – do not contradict either of the related GTAA Master Plans. “Capacity” definitions are clearly outlined in both the 2008 Master Plan and in the Needs Assessment Study.

Nowhere in the KPMG Supply and Demand Report (or anywhere else in the study’s four reports) does KPMG state or even imply that a Pickering airport will be needed by 2036. The report does say, multiple times, that it WON’T be needed. And nowhere does GTAA say or even imply that the airport will be needed in 2037 or at any known date after that. A review of the calculations provided by all these Transport Canada reports suggests that it is unreasonable to conclude that a Pickering airport would be viable before the year 2100. (Appendix 7)

This view is supported by the current GTAA Master Plan gate build projections and airline passenger-load-factor increases per movement, as presented in their annual reports. (Appendix 7-D)

Conclusion: A Pickering airport may never be contractually or financially viable. (Appendix 7-G)

Oshawa Airport an Economic Driver?

On March 28, 2022, Oshawa Council considered its airport's future in two reports: From the Development Service Committee (DSC) meeting of Mar. 7, 2022, the report **DS-22-64** (pp. 83-91) — Re amending 1997 Operating and Option Agreement for the Oshawa Executive Airport (Appendix 8) and the report **DS-22-67** — Proposed Noise Abatement Procedures for the Oshawa Executive Airport. (Appendices 8 and 10)

Oshawa forwarded both reports to the Minister of Transport with requests for changes to the 1997 Oshawa Operating and Options Agreement (the Transport Canada—Oshawa legal agreement). Both reports reference an impending Pickering Airport build, as does the 1997 Oshawa Operating and Options Agreement itself. Both Oshawa and Durham have stated, without providing supporting evidence, that Toronto International will be at capacity in 2036.

Report DS-22-64 advised on a continuing and increasing – and previously undisclosed – airport debt of about **\$10 million**, and seeks to (1) open the agreement, (2) amend the agreement by 14 years to obtain an earlier termination date, and (3) enable the sale of some airport lands now. (Once permitted, the selling of land will likely continue, as the proceeds from the sales will help to pay down operating deficits that are a product of mismanagement.) (Appendix 9)

Report DS-22-67 engages in and details a process, required by Transport Canada, to attempt to legalize and enforce Oshawa Council's wishes for new (and unprecedented) restricted hours of operation at Oshawa Airport to reduce noise although there is video evidence that the community had been aware ahead of time that 100,000 training movements would be part of Oshawa airport's decision to be a base for a flying school. (Appendices 9 and 14)

This is an extensive arbitration process, which has been undertaken by an approved aviation specialist who in this case is young and clearly inexperienced, per his resume, which demonstrates to me that he will be overwhelmed by Oshawa senior staff.

“Noise” is a value legally defined by the Government of Canada and the Government of Ontario. Based on that legal definition, **there is no “noise”** at Oshawa Airport and no sound that exceeds that which Highway 401 delivers 24/7 on a 1-mile swath across Durham.¹

Toronto Pearson receives 363 noise complaints per 1000 movements.² Oshawa gets 3 per 1000,³ and note that the noise contours of the flight school are inside the airport boundary. (Appendix 10)

The bulk of the operational restrictions Oshawa seeks are extraordinary in nature and are unprecedented in the industry. (Appendix 10)

The two Oshawa documents clearly indicate a lack of due diligence by the city. Such failures can result in an airport's loss of viability, a lack of regional growth, loss of ownership of the airport as outlined in the 1997 Operating and Option Agreement for the Oshawa Executive Airport, or Oshawa Airport's premature closure. Oshawa Airport is specifically named in the GTAA's Ground Lease as being outside the GTAA/Transport Canada legal agreement restrictions within Article 44. (Appendix 1) If Oshawa fails to operate its airport according to the 1997 agreement, Transport Canada can resume airport operation. (Appendix 11)

Summary

The Minister of Transport cannot go forward with Pickering, by contract as long as Toronto Pearson is “meeting all capacity and demand requirements.” See Article 44, GTAA/TC Ground Lease. No capacity constraint is anticipated at Toronto International in the foreseeable future; therefore, there is no business case for Pickering.

Durham Council has been misled regarding Toronto International Airport capacity by the GTAA, Transport Canada, and various “experts.”

The Minister of Transport cannot approve noise regulations in Oshawa. There is no airport noise at Oshawa by definition.

Oshawa Airport’s business plan increasingly fails, due to mismanagement and a lack of expertise.

Recommendations

If Durham Regional Council truly believes in the benefits of airports as growth drivers, Council should assume some measure of control and immediately intervene with the Minister of Transport to request that he incorporate the Oshawa Airport into the National Airport System and lease it under a long-term contract to a viable professional entity. Can he do that? Yes, he can. (Appendix 11)

Durham Council should call the GTAA to account. Council has the most expedient means of doing so. (Appendix 15)

Notes:

1. Aercoustics Engineering Ltd.: Durham Live Tourist Destination – City of Pickering Ref. A 03/14, Environmental Noise Feasibility Study, May 29, 2014. https://www.pickering.ca/en/city-hall/resources/A0314_NoiseStudy_May2014.pdf
2. Government of Canada, Honourable Judy A. Sgro, Chair: Assessing the Impact of Aircraft Noise in the Vicinity of Major Canadian Airports: Report of the Standing Committee on Transport, Infrastructure and Communities, March 2019. <https://www.ourcommons.ca/Content/Committee/421/TRAN/Reports/RP10366059/tranrp28/tranrp28-e.pdf>.
3. HM Aero Aviation Consulting: Oshawa Executive Airport: Proposed Noise Abatement Procedures – Public Consultation Materials, Final Report, September 27, 2021 (p. 10) <https://www.oshawa.ca/en/transportation-parking/resources/Documents/CYOO---Public-Consultation-Materials---2021.09.27---Final-Report.pdf>

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The author is a retired Bombardier Downsview 10,000 hr. DH 8 production test pilot. During a 40+ year aviation career, I worked for Transport Canada for 7 years planning/flight checking, certifying the Ontario airports/navigation system. I have flown and taught aviation globally in scheduled and unscheduled operations.

Appendix 1: GTAA Ground Lease, Article 44

Note: This article is common to all national airports in Canada.

Note

“Will not”

Note

“or Oshawa”

43.01.01 The Tenant acknowledges that the Landlord is subject to the **Access to Information Act**, R.S.C. 1985, c.A-1 and may be required to release this Lease and any other information or documents in Her possession or control relating to this Lease pursuant to the **Access to Information Act**.

ARTICLE 44 - DIRECT COMPETITION BY LANDLORD

Section 44.01 Direct Competition by Landlord

44.01.01 If the Tenant is continuously and actively meeting any capacity and demand requirements for airport and aviation services at the Airport, the Landlord will not construct and operate, during the Term, an airport as a Major International Airport within seventy-five (75) kilometres from any point on the perimeter of the Lands.

44.01.02 Nothing in this Article 44 shall prohibit, restrict, affect or reduce:

- (a) the right or power of the Parliament of Canada to enact laws;
- (b) the Landlord's right to construct or operate the Toronto City Centre airport, Hamilton airport, or Oshawa airport in any manner it deems appropriate;
- (c) the Landlord's right to levy and collect (subject to any of the other Instruments) taxes, fees and charges related to any governmental function, including any:
 - (i) air transportation tax,
 - (ii) ticket tax,
 - (iii) regulatory fees,
 - (iv) local air navigation service fees,
 - (v) en route fees, and

- (vi) charge or fee to recover any direct and indirect cost to the Landlord of providing any service at the Airport.

ARTICLE 45 - ENTIRE AGREEMENT

<https://>

cdn.torontopearson.com/-/media/project/pearson/content/corporate/who-we-are/pdfs/publications/ground-lease.pdf?modified=20190508161505&rev=e96ec6f4cf27475188e030b52c485d15&hash=BA88E2D6D0CD7CC2AC30E4AFC856CA00

Appendix 2: Toronto Pearson International Airport Master Plan, 2017–2037

Regarding potential for 6th runway (p41):

| 41

6. Airside System

An airport's ability to grow is largely determined by the capacity of its airside system – in the simplest terms, all of the infrastructure that aircraft use before and after their flights, from fuel and deicing facilities to parking areas and cargo loading equipment. The relative maturity of Toronto Pearson's airside system is therefore a critical factor in our long-term planning. Any proposed development of other major airport sub-systems – including terminals, cargo facilities, and groundside access and support functions – must be aligned with our airside system to ensure balanced growth across all operations.

Note **Introduction**

Runways form the heart of any airside system. An airport can only accommodate so many – typically fewer than its physical footprint might suggest. Moreover, runways require space beyond the areas actually used by planes to land and take off; they also need taxiways, operational zones such as aprons, and room for navigational aids. Various regulations and standards designed to ensure the safe operation of aircraft also affect runway configuration, along with the overall capacity of airside infrastructure.

In the early 1990s, Transport Canada conducted an environmental assessment exploring the prospect of adding three new runways at Toronto Pearson. Two have since been constructed and commissioned, bringing the total number of runways to five. A sixth was approved as part of the assessment but has not been built. We'll continue to monitor demand in order to make sound projections – in consultation with our stakeholders – about whether this additional runway might be required to support increased passenger traffic, operational resiliency, a growing region and expansion of the broader Canadian economy.

The analysis presented in this chapter suggests that our current five-runway airside system will accommodate projected traffic increases within the timeframe of this Master Plan; a sixth runway is not needed to meet growth through 2037. However, we will continue to protect the necessary land and zoning, as detailed in our Land Use Plan. Demand is indeed growing, and we expect that additional airside capacity will be required at some point. When, exactly, will depend on how factors such as increased aircraft movements, the renewal of carrier fleets and the need for operational continuity evolve relative to our projections.

Another factor that will influence future infrastructure discussions is the prospect of trade-offs in service quality.

<https://cdn.torontopearson.com/-/media/project/pearson/content/corporate/who-we-are/pdfs/publications/master-plan-min.pdf?modified=20190328155402&rev=c2de3cc7194a49b1a19952393726ccc6&hash=455F8523173448C394644FC1686BB011>

Appendix 3: Response by the Minister of Transport, April 12, 2021

Minister Omar Alghabra's response to a petition presented to the House of Commons:

Response by the Minister of Transport

Signed by (Minister or Parliamentary Secretary): The Honourable Omar Alghabra

The Government of Canada is taking a balanced approach to the management of the Pickering Lands, ensuring environmental, aviation and economic demands are being met.

In June 2013, the Government of Canada announced that it would retain a smaller land area for retention for a potential future airport site in the southeast quadrant of the Pickering Lands. The Government concurrently announced that it was transferring approximately 4,700 acres of the Pickering Lands to Parks Canada Agency (PCA) for the creation of the Rouge National Urban Park (RNUP). The transfer was completed in April 2015. Subsequently, on April 1, 2017, an additional 5,200 acres was transferred to PCA to further expand the RNUP. Transport Canada has retained approximately 8,700 acres for a potential future airport.



In 2015, Dr. Gary Polonsky, the Independent Advisor on the Economic Development of the Pickering Lands, was mandated by the Government to conduct targeted stakeholder consultations on the future development of the Pickering Lands, including a potential future airport. The Advisor's report, as well as Transport Canada's response to his recommendations, are publicly available online at the following links: <https://www.tc.gc.ca/eng/ontario/economic-development-pickering-lands.html> and <https://www.tc.gc.ca/eng/ontario/report-pickering-lands.html>

In May 2016, Transport Canada awarded a contract to KPMG to undertake a Pickering Lands Aviation Sector Analysis, which will update supply and demand forecasts from the 2011 Needs Assessment Study for aviation traffic, develop options for the type and role of an airport in the regional airport system, and provide an assessment of the economic impact of these options. The analysis was completed in 2019.

In 2018, Transport Canada completed an agricultural lease renewal initiative which provided greater certainty to farmers through longer lease tenures. As of April 1, 2018, all agricultural leases were updated to a 10-year lease term. This agricultural lease model has enabled lease holders to make sound business decisions by providing longer tenures and fixed rental rates.

The timing of any decision concerning the development of a potential airport on the Pickering Lands will be influenced by many market and non-market factors beyond the exclusive consideration of passenger capacities at other airports within the Southern Ontario airports system. Such factors may include, but are not limited to: shifting airline business models, regional population growth and evolving demographics, infrastructure needs and investments, as well as the interests and needs of regional stakeholders.

There are no predetermined decisions based on results from the Aviation Sector Analysis, and no decisions or plans have been made to develop an airport on the Pickering Lands. The Aviation Sector Analysis would be one of many inputs into the development of a future recommendation for the Pickering Lands. Any decision on the development of the Pickering Lands will be made based on a sound business case and updated data on aviation demand and capacity.

 **History** 

Presented to the House of Commons
[Jennifer O'Connell \(Pickering—Uxbridge\)](#)

Note



<https://petitions.ourcommons.ca/en/Petition/Details?Petition=432-00562>

Appendix 4: GTAA Master Plan, 2008-2030

(Ch.15 p.15.1

Pertinent section highlighted

APPROACHING TORONTO PEARSON'S CAPACITY

Chapter 15

15.1 SYNOPSIS

Toronto Pearson is the principal airport for commercial air service activity within the GTA and south-central Ontario, a role that the Airport is expected to retain throughout the planning horizon of this Master Plan. Previous chapters of this Master Plan have discussed the ability of Toronto Pearson to continue to fulfill this function. This chapter will discuss the potential consequences as Toronto Pearson nears its capacity. As stated in Chapter 5, due to the large land areas required for runways and associated facilities, the airside system defines the ultimate capacity of the Airport. The development of other major sub-systems including passenger terminals and ground transportation facilities will be carried out so as to maintain a balanced system.

Chapter 5 of this Master Plan defined the capacity limits of Toronto Pearson's airside system under two scenarios, the current five-runway system and the six-runway system, which represents the maximum build out of airside capacity within the Toronto Pearson site.

Based on current traffic patterns, technologies, standards and operational protocols, the five-runway



system has a practical capacity of approximately 520,000 aircraft movements and a maximum capacity of 610,000 aircraft movements per annum. Air traffic demand forecasts for Toronto Pearson suggest that the practical capacity of the five-runway system will be reached by approximately 2013, while its maximum capacity with significant levels of airside congestion and delay will be reached by about 2019.

The practical capacity of the six-runway system has been calculated to be approximately 580,000 aircraft movements and the maximum capacity has been calculated to be 680,000 aircraft movements per annum. Current traffic forecasts suggest that the practical and maximum capacities of the six-runway system will be reached by 2017 and 2023 respectively. This

six-runway airside capacity range translates into an equivalent passenger volume range of approximately 46 to 54 million passengers per annum.

Having a dependable and predictable airport operation which results in strong, on-time departure and arrival performance is an extremely important performance factor for airlines and the travelling public. Under either the five-runway or six-runway scenario, as Toronto Pearson surpasses its practical airside



Excerpt from the Synopsis on the previous page (critical details in bold)

“the **five-runway system** has a **practical capacity** of approximately **520,000** aircraft movements and a **maximum capacity** of **610,000** aircraft movements per annum. Air traffic demand forecasts for Toronto Pearson suggest that the practical capacity of the five-runway system will be reached by approximately **2013**, while its maximum capacity with significant levels of airside congestion and delay will be reached by about **2019**.

The **practical capacity of the six- runway system** has been calculated to be approximately **580,000** aircraft movements and the **maximum capacity has been calculated to be 680,000** aircraft movements per annum. Current traffic forecasts suggest that the **practical and maximum capacities of the six-runway system will be reached by 2017 and 2023** respectively.”

Comment 1

Stated otherwise:

“In 5 years a 10 year window will occur starting in 2013 that concludes in 2023.”

And

Sequentially the following must take place before reaching the airport CAPACITY limit:

- a) *Practical capacity for the 5 runway system [being 85% of max. capacity].*
- b) *Construction and completion of the 6th runway taking ~5 years.*
- c) *Maximum capacity of the 5th runway, [assumed an innocuous event].*
- d) *Practical capacity of the 6th runway; and*
- e) *6th runway maximum capacity and Maximum **Capacity** of the airport. [the only event that can contractually trigger Pickering]*

Comment 1

It is wrong the error is extreme

Toronto never attained this **520,000** number in the next 10 years.

The calculation that generated these numbers can be found in GTAA's Master plan Chapter 5 page 11 below

Cont'd

(CH. 5,p.5.11

Calculations for the 5-runway system



Terminal Apron Areas and Dual Taxiway System

arrival runway, and 33R being used for departures and some possible off-loading of arrivals from 33L. The second diagram shows the operations that would occur under strong south wind conditions with 15R being used as the primary arrival runway, and 15L being used for departures and some possible off-loading of arrivals from 15R.

Through an analysis of historical aircraft movement data, the capacity of the north/south runways was found to be 75 movements per hour while the frequency of use tends to be approximately five per cent of the time in the 33 direction and approximately one per cent of the time in the 15 direction for a total of approximately six per cent of the time.

Irregular Operations: The final type of operation shown in the capacity coverage chart is termed "irregular" operations, which includes operational conditions that typically result in an airside throughput significantly below the other three more "regular" types of operations. Irregular operations do not relate to any specific

runway configuration, but rather could involve the use of any runway(s) depending on operational circumstances.

There are four primary types of events that comprise irregular operations:

- Snowstorms, that require the periodic closure of runways and taxiways for snow removal and the need to deice/anti-ice aircraft prior to departure.
- Thunderstorms, that result in an inability to load, unload or service aircraft on the apron due to unsafe working conditions.

- Poor visibility conditions, that limit operations to the runways and to aircraft with appropriate navigational equipment for such conditions.
- Other ad hoc circumstances that require the temporary closure of airside infrastructure, such as during emergency situations.

Based on an analysis of historical aircraft throughput data associated with irregular operations, the average throughput achieved during these types of events is approximately 30 movements per hour and these conditions tend to occur approximately one per cent of the time.

Average Hourly Capacity: Using the hourly capacity and frequency information from each of the four types of operations in the capacity coverage chart, Toronto Pearson's average hourly airside capacity can be calculated as follows:

$$(79\% \times 126) + (14\% \times 108) + (6\% \times 75) + (1\% \times 30) = 119 \text{ aircraft movements per hour}$$

TABLE 5-2 MAXIMUM AND PRACTICAL ANNUAL CAPACITIES FOR THE EXISTING FIVE-RUNWAY SYSTEM

Hour Group	Time Period(s)	Number of Hours	Typical Demand	Average Hourly Capacity	Planning Day Capacity
Peak	6:30 a.m. – 9:29 a.m. 2:30 p.m. – 9:29 p.m.	10	x 1.00	x 119	= 1,190
Off-Peak	9:30 a.m. – 2:29 p.m.	5	x 0.80	x 119	= 476
Transitional	9:30 p.m. – 12:29 a.m.	3	x 0.55	x 119	= 196
Night	12:30 a.m. – 6:29 a.m.	6	Capacity defined by nighttime operations budget		55
			Planning Day Capacity		1,917
					x 320
			Maximum Annual Capacity (Rounded)		610,000
					x 85%
			Practical Annual Capacity (Rounded)		520,000

Comment

Please see Appendix 7 for explanations of the errors on this page.

Cont'd

(Ch.5, p.5-18

Calculations for the 6th runway system



runways, Toronto Pearson's average hourly airside capacity for the six-runway system would be calculated as follows:

$$(79\% \times 140) + (14\% \times 120) + (6\% \times 75) + (1\% \times 30) = 132 \text{ aircraft movements per hour}$$

Following the same method as was used in Section 5.2.7, this average

translated into a maximum achievable annual capacity of 680,000 and a practical annual capacity of 580,000 as shown in Table 5-3.

5.3.5 Demand/Capacity Assessment

The resulting annual capacity range for the six-runway system is

TABLE 5-3 MAXIMUM AND PRACTICAL ANNUAL CAPACITIES FOR THE ULTIMATE SIX-RUNWAY SYSTEM

Hour Group	Time Period(s)	Number of Hours	Typical Demand	Average Hourly Capacity	Planning Day Capacity
Peak	6:30 a.m. – 9:29 a.m. 2:30 p.m. – 9:29 p.m.	10	x 1.00	x 132	= 1,320
Off-Peak	9:30 a.m. – 2:29 p.m.	5	x 0.80	x 132	= 528
Transitional	9:30 p.m. – 12:29 a.m.	3	x 0.55	x 132	= 218
Night	12:30 a.m. – 6:29 a.m.	6	Capacity defined by nighttime operations budget		62
			Planning Day Capacity		2,128
					x 320
			Maximum Annual Capacity (Rounded)		680,000
					x 85%
			Practical Annual Capacity (Rounded)		580,000



Comment

Please see Appendix 7 for explanations of the errors on this page.


Appendix 5: Needs Assessment Study: Pickering Lands, 2010

A copy can be provided on request

Excerpts

“1.1 Study Background

In 2005, Transport Canada completed a preliminary due diligence review of the previous studies, and identified the need for some additional work to determine whether there is a future need for an airport on the Pickering lands, and if so the timing required for development.



Accordingly, in the fall of 2005, the Minister of Transport announced that Transport Canada would:

1. Coordinate further study regarding whether the airports serving the Greater Golden Horseshoe (GGH) area have the capacity to accommodate future air traffic demand.
2. Conduct a comprehensive due diligence review to determine the next steps for the Pickering lands.

As a significant part of the first item, Transport Canada retained the GTAA to undertake the Needs Assessment Study - Pickering Lands. This document is the report associated with the Needs Assessment Study.”.....Ch. 1, Page 1 of 8

Comment

See NASPL chapter 4: Person average hourly capacity calculations and conclusions are identical for 5 and 6 runway configurations and those presented in ch 5(pp5.11 and 5.18 of the GTAA's 2008 Master Plan. above.

These capacity calculation errors are identical, large, and coordinated.

Appendix 6: Pickering Lands Aviation Sector Analysis: Supply and Demand Report, 2016

(Copy available on request.)

Excerpts (bold added)

Executive summary, p.2, par 1:

“This Supply and Demand Report presents an up-to-date projection as to whether **aviation capacity constraints** will trigger the need for an additional airport in the southern Ontario airport system within the next 20 years.”

Section 7.3.1 Selected Airfield Capacity Model, p. 105(121):

“The Prototype Airfield Capacity Model (PACM) was utilized in the determination of **airfield capacity** at each airport within the southern Ontario airports system **(except Toronto Pearson where capacity values were provided by the GTAA and validated by the project team)**” ...

“The model is not meant to replace detailed capacity analysis which often utilizes programs such as the FAA Airport and Airspace Simulation Model (SIMMOD) or the FAA Airfield Delay Simulation Model (ADSIM).”

Section 7.4.1.2 Airfield, p. 113(130)

“Currently at Toronto Pearson, the **GTAA applies an hourly cap of 90 movements in planning** its operations. Accordingly, under Base Condition and Condition A, **the cap of 90 movements has been used** as the hourly practical runway movement capacity for Toronto Pearson as this reflects current practices.”

and on p.114(131):


“Future airfield capacity is constrained by the current runway system. **There are no firm plans for adding an additional east-west parallel runway.**”

Comment

Why (financially) plan, it is not needed... “**Future** airfield capacity is constrained”. True ...But when?

To repeat from A 2 above **GTAA MASTER PLAN 2017-2037 page 41**

“**a sixth runway is not needed to meet growth through 2037. However, we will continue to protect the necessary land and zoning, as detailed in our Land Use Plan. Demand is indeed growing, and we expect that additional airside capacity will be required at some point.**”



Appendix 7: Where the Error Lies: The Math of “Capacity”

Toronto Capacity was explicitly determined and defined in the GTAA 20 year plan of 2008-2030 Chapter 15 Pg. 15.1 Synopsis; And, It said in summary as explained above:

“In 5 years a 10 year window will occur starting in 2013 that concludes in 2023.”

Year 2013 has long passed; Both GTAA and Transport Canada (KPMG) were forced undertake an update.

- There were no runway configuration changes; the 6th was never built.
- The capacity calculations had to be “reconfigured”.
- GTAA 2017, p. 41, stated *“The analysis presented in this chapter suggests that our current five-runway airside system will accommodate projected traffic increases within the [2017-2037] timeframe of this Master Plan.”*
- KPMG 2016, p.128 stated (bold added) **“Future** airfield capacity is constrained by the current runway system.” Transport Canada limited KPMG to a 20-year forecast horizon (2016-2036), a period when the GTAA calculates a 5-runway system will have sufficient practical capacity. The GTAA’s potential need to build a 6th runway sometime after 2037 was beyond KPMG’s planning horizon.

Neither study plans a sixth runway, which would take 3-5 years to build.

IF: A 5 year lead time has gone to a 30 year lead time at a minimum per the 2017 Master Plan, THEN: The 10 year window also expands.

***IF 5 becomes 30 = year 2043
then 10 becomes 60 = year 2103***

And that is conservative. It is also challenging to comprehend. The level of error is extreme. Is it true?. It is. We know that. Why have the projections of both TC and GTAA been so poor?

The following pages reveal the fundamental errors and miscalculations regarding capacity.

Cont’d

(Appendix 7: Where the Error Lies: The Math of “Capacity,” cont’d)

A GTAA forecasts

3.12

TABLE 3-6 ITINERANT AIRCRAFT MOVEMENTS							
	Year	Air Carrier – Passenger Aircraft				Cargo, Business Aviation, Ferry, Technical	Total Itinerant
		Domestic	Transborder	International	Total		
Actual	1990	172,000	97,000	27,000	296,000	56,000	352,000
	1995	156,000	113,000	25,000	294,000	49,000	343,000
	1996	170,000	132,000	25,000	327,000	45,000	372,000
	1997	168,000	147,000	27,000	342,000	53,000	395,000
	1998	177,000	162,000	28,000	367,000	54,000	421,000
	1999	195,000	170,000	30,000	395,000	30,000	425,000
	2000	168,000	181,000	37,000	386,000	41,000	427,000
	2001	148,000	178,000	38,000	364,000	42,000	406,000
	2002	135,000	167,000	35,000	337,000	46,000	383,000
	2003	136,000	155,000	36,000	327,000	44,000	371,000
	2004	151,000	161,000	43,000	355,000	49,000	404,000
	2005	152,000	160,000	44,000	356,000	53,000	409,000
2006	163,000	159,000	45,000	367,000	51,000	417,000	
Forecast	2010	181,000	186,000	54,000	421,000	60,000	481,000
	2015	204,000	220,000	66,000	490,000	65,000	555,000
	2020	229,000	257,000	78,000	564,000	73,000	637,000
	2025	253,000	297,000	91,000	641,000	81,000	722,000
	2030	278,000	331,000	103,000	712,000	89,000	801,000

The GTAA’s 2008 Master Plan forecasted 555,000 itinerant aircraft movements in 2015. The actual number of movements from 2015 annual reports: 444,000. This is a forecasting error on the order of 20%. **Why the overestimated growth**

B The calculations of Average Hourly Capacity ,

Practical Capacity and Maximum Capacity are low, in both GTAA Master plans, as well as in NASPL , and KPMG. See appendices 5 & 6 above.

In the GTAA’s 2008 Master plan (p. 5.11) or a **5 runway airport** we see (bold added):

“Toronto Pearson’s average hourly airside capacity can be calculated as follows:
(79% x 126) + (14% x 108) + (6% x 75) + (1% x 30) = 119 aircraft movements / hour.” .

The explanation for this calculation is on p.5.9 of the Master plan

“...this type of [E/W runway] operation has an absolute capacity of approximately 126 aircraft movements per hour, including 56 operations on Runway 05-23 and 70 operations on the closely spaced parallel runways, Runways 06-24R and 06R-24L.”

Cont’d

(Appendix 7: Where the Error Lies: The Math of “Capacity,” cont’d)

Additionally the GTAA 2008 Master P (p. 5.18) tells us (bold added):

*“Applying the hourly capacities associated with the simultaneous operation of the four east/west runways, Toronto Pearson’s average hourly airside capacity for the **six runway system** would be calculated as follows:*

$$(79\% \times 140) + (14\% \times 120) + (6\% \times 75) + (1\% \times 30) = 132 \text{ aircraft movements per hour}”$$

In 2017 this GTAA calculation for the 5 runway calculation remained the same (see 2017 GTAA Master Plan, pp.46-49. A great deal of effort was expended to hide the fact that numbers were unchanged, the report saying:

These capacity values reflect operations under instrument meteorological conditions (IMC).

and later saying:

Weather data suggests that we should be able to count on this capacity approximately 93 per cent of the time.

This latter is a misstatement. From the formulae visual meteorological conditions (VMC) weather exists 85% (79+6) of the time. IMC exists only 14% of the time.

More significantly, on Page 47 of the 2017 Master plan we find (bold added):

*“Our analysis of recent data indicates that the capacity of the north/south runways is **nearly 90 aircraft movements per hour** under visual meteorological conditions (VMC), which are typical when the north/south runways are in use.”*

This capability upgrade from 75 (see GTAA 2008 master Plan, p. 5.11) was not addressed in GTAA’s airport runway capacity calculations. KPMG basically agreed with the 2017 GTAA Master Plan, calculating N/S runway capacity at 86 movements per hr.(see 2016 KPMG Supply and demand report, section 7.4.1.2, p.113, line 11.

Given the increased N/S runway capacity, GTAA should have recalculated the average hourly airport capacity as follows:

5 runway

$$(0.79 \times (56+84)) + (.14 \times (48+72)) + (.06 \times 90) + (.01 \times 30) = 133.1...$$

6 runway

$$(0.79 \times (84+84)) + (.14 \times (72+72)) + (.06 \times 90) + (.01 \times 30) = 158.58...$$

This was not done. The numbers presented were deliberately low.

Cont’d .

(Appendix 7: Where the Error Lies: The Math of “Capacity,” cont’d)


RE the average hourly capacity numbers on the previous page: Inherent with in them the reader should understand that on a sunny summer day with light winds, the airport’s hourly capacity is $56+84 = 140$ and for the sixth runway is $84+84 = 168$ and that most certainly, by the time the 6th runway arrives, numbers will exceed $90+90 = 180$ per hour.

Excerpt

From Toronto Pearson Airport Master Plan, 2017-2037 (p. 37-38)

Peak-Day Profiles

As a complement to our peak-hour forecasts, we also model typical busy days. Peak-day profiles enable us to track growth in passenger traffic during the shoulder periods around peak hours and generally help to contextualize peaks within the normal fluctuations of airport traffic. Limits noted in Figure 5-8 are indicative of demand management associated with aircraft movement activity.



The use of planning numbers of 90 by KPMG and 90 and 108 by GTAA were deliberately too low and, therefore, false.

Cont’d

(Appendix 7: Where the Error Lies: The Math of “Capacity,” cont’d)

C Benchmark Daily and Annual Numbers Updated

From 2017 GTAA Master Plan, p.137 (bold added):

*Night Flight Restriction Program. Transport Canada restricts flights to and from Toronto Pearson between 12:30 a.m. and 6:30 a.m. Under the Night Flight Budget system, which aims to limit nighttime noise, only **about** 3 per cent of [daily] landings and departures take place during restricted hours.”*

(Note that KPMG ignore nighttime air traffic I their report.)

Using the latest average hourly airside capacity data, Toronto Pearson’s correct annual and daily capacity is calculated using the following formula:

Average Hrly X 18 Hrs /day X 1.03 nite Hrs X 365 d /yr

5 runway system:

133.1 X18X 365 X1.03=**900,701 annual or 2468 daily movements**

6 runway system:

158.6 X18X 365 X1.03=**1,073,127 annual or 2940 daily movements**

Compare the 5-runway annual capacity calculation above to:

- The GTAA 2017-2037 Master plan. (p. 49), which claim (bold added) a “*maximum annual airside capacity of **650,000 aircraft movements***”. They use a 95th percentile vs the standard 85th percentile.
- KPMG’s report (see next page) which is charted in Table 7.1 (p.115) an annually Practical throughput **622,000 aircraft movements**.

Comments

Given that the GTAA is forecasting that a 6th runway won't be needed until sometime after 2037 -- beyond the planning horizon of both studies -- annual capacities for a 6th runway were not calculated.

At its busiest, Toronto Pearson is operating at below 50% of its capacity.

Cont’d.

(Appendix 7: Where the Error Lies: The Math of “Capacity,” cont’d)

From KPMG: Supply and Demand report, 2016 (p. 115(131))

Table 7.1 - Toronto Pearson Airport Estimated Airfield Capacity

	Base Case	Condition A	Condition B
Flight Rules	IFR	IFR	IFR
Maximum Throughput (Hourly)	117	117	139.9
Practical Factor: :	CAP	CAP	CAP
Practical Throughput (Hourly)	90	90	108
Daily Operation Factor (Hours):	x 18	x 18	x 18
Practical Throughput (Daily)	1620	1620	1944
Annualization Factor (Days/Annum):	x320	X320	x 320
Practical Throughput (Annual)	518,400	518,400	622,080
	518,000	518,000	622,000
Runway passenger factor	128	148	148
Aircraft load factor:	0.8	0.8	0.8
Runway Passenger Capacity (Annual)	53,084,160	61,378,560	73,654,272
	53,100,000	61,400,000	73,700,000

Comment


My view: Because KPMG deliberately uses low hourly practical aircraft movement data, ignores nighttime air traffic, and states that Pearson operates 320 days/year when everyone knows that Toronto's airport is a 24 /7 operation, these facts render the complete report useless ... full stop.

D Gate Build Numbers. What do they tell us?

What does Toronto believe? See the GTAA’s 2017 Master Plan (p. 38-39):

“Apron and aircraft parking areas are designed based on peak occupancy, also known as peak stand demand.”

“We’re also continually adapting and enhancing ground operations to better meet peak-hour demand throughout our facilities.”



Peak Stand Demand			
	Wide Body Gates	Narrow Body Gates	Total Gates
2017	31	61	92
2022	40	65	105
2027	51	64	115
2037	79	72	151

Table 5-4: Peak Stand Demand by Aircraft Type

Comments

The 2017 GTAA Master Plan (p. 41 paragraph 4) reads as follows:

“The analysis presented in this chapter suggests that our current five-runway airside system will accommodate projected traffic increases within the timeframe of this Master Plan;”

The 2018 GTAA annual report (p.F5) reads as follows:

Annual Movements 465,000 (precisely 465.4 in thousands)

If 92 gates in 2017= 465,000 movements what does 151 gates equal? Answer **763,207**

What is their real estimate of 5 runway **practical** capacity?

We said in this appendix, p.14: max. capacity **900,701** and taken at 15% reduction (X .85), **practical capacity =765,596**

This is virtually the same as the preceding answer and is no coincidence.

Cont’d

(Appendix 7: Where the Error Lies: The Math of “Capacity,” cont’d)

Big Question

Using the GTAA's data from its 2017 Master Plan, the calculated correct practical capacity of Pearson airport is 765,596 aircraft movements per year.

So why does the GTAA falsely state a 650,000 maximum capacity on p. 49 in the same Plan?

Cont’d.


(Appendix 7: Where the Error Lies: The Math of “Capacity”, cont’d)

E. Why does GTAA consistently over state growth)?



This is best said in their own words. Sources: Nov. 8, 2017, Regional Council minutes (p. 5 of 21) and associated GTAA presentation titled “Toronto Pearson Canada’s Gateway.”

This is the document, provided by Hillary Marshall, GTAA. There are 2 pages of interest.



This is from p. 4. It graphs Population and Aircraft movements. They conclude they are coincident to 2037. The point of “When do we get Pickering” is not just “airport CAPACITY”. It is also about the rate of growth of aircraft movements and has nothing to do with population growth, as is so often relied upon.

To best understand, here is a good basic analogy:
You are Durham Commissioner and you want reliable bus transportation to the Toronto Airport. You buy 100 buses and contract an operator. He pays you a monthly fee for the buses. He operates “Airport to Durham” in what is called a “wet operation.” He staffs, maintains, and collects fares. After 10 years all is good all are happy, your busses are paid off.

Cont’d

(Appendix 7: Where the Error Lies: The Math of “Capacity”, cont’d)

Durham initiates a large housing project and you advise the operator that in the next year your population will double. What do you both do? Scenario #1 double your buses? Or Scenario #2: buy 100 double decker busses?

In the aviation business, the GTAA call this #2 Scenario “aircraft up-gauging.”

Originally the GTAA thought there was zero up-gauging, in which case the passengers per aircraft remains the same, as in Scenario #1, and movements directly responded to population growth (see Needs Assessment Study Pickering Lands (NASPL), section 4.4.5. This proved not to be the case. Scenario #2 is the reality.

If passengers numbers per passenger aircraft increase in lockstep with population growth, then aircraft movements remain static, and Pickering never happens. And the Blue line on slide above is horizontal. And the slide is false.

Now let’s look at p. 8 Pearson’s presentation:



For comments on this slide, see next page.

Cont’d

(Appendix 7: Where the Error Lies: The Math of “Capacity”, cont’d)

Compound Interest Calculator

Compound Interest | SIP Calculator | Daily Compounding

Currency: \$ € £ ₹ ¥

Initial balance: \$ 106

Interest rate: 1.4 % yearly

Years: 20 Months: 0

Compound interval: Yearly (1/yr)

Advanced options

Regular contributions (optional): Deposits Withdrawals

Deposit amount (optional): \$ monthly

Increase deposits yearly with inflation? (optional)

Calculate

Calculation Projection

Future investment value	Initial balance
\$139.98	\$106.00
Total interest earned	Effective Annual Rate (APY)
\$33.98	1.4%

Third line of Pearson's slide:

2016-2037 indicates passenger loads increase from 106 to 140. Passengers /passenger aircraft movement.


Input to a compound calculator= **over 20 years 1.4%.**

Bottom Line re Pearsons slide: Both line 2 and line 3 of the slide above cannot be true in a stated population growth of 1.43 %.

P.S. the growth rate in 20 years on 456,000-632,000 is 1.645%

<https://www.thecalculatorsite.com/finance/calculators/compoundinterestcalculator.php>


F. Question: What is really happening? (seeGTAA's 2015 Annual Report, p. f4)



Cont'd

(Appendix 7: Where the Error Lies: The Math of “Capacity”, cont’d)

From 2018 GTAA Annual Report, p. f6:



NOTE:

load factors: 81.5 per cent in 2014 to 82.0 per cent in 2015 for a a year-over-year absolute growth in the average load factor of 0.4 per cent.

Load factor increases 81.8 in 2016; 82.6 in 2017; 83.4 in 2018 Pg f5

Compound Interest | SIP Calculator | Daily Compounding

Currency: \$ | £ | € | ₹ | ¥

Initial balance: \$ 111

Interest rate: 2.57 % yearly

Years: 8 Months: 0

Compound interval: Yearly (1/yr)

Advanced options -

Regular contributions (optional): Deposits | Withdrawals

Deposit amount (optional): \$ | yearly

Increase deposits yearly with inflation? (optional)

Calculate

Calculation Projection

Future investment value	Initial balance
\$135.98	\$111.00
Total interest earned	Effective Annual Rate (APY)
\$24.98	2.57%

Without consideration of the load factor increases from 81.5-83.4 that average ~0.4% per year these charts provide a conservative compound increase of **111-136** or 2.57% annually viewed over 8 years.

This would indicate stagnant movement growth rates.

Various GTAA annual reports section f show:

1997395,292

2011428,477

2018473,000 total movements).

This delivers a 0.855% over a long term compounded increase in total movements

Cont'd

G. Summary of Capacity Errors identified on pp.9-20-21 of This Appendix

(Errors made by both Transport Canada and GTAA)Both TC and GTAA)

1. In 2008, the GTAA over-estimated movement growth-rate forecasts by 20%.
2. In 2008, the GTAA reasonably calculated and explained average hourly movements.
3. In 2011, in GTAA's Needs Assessment Report to Transport Canada (NASPL) aircraft capacity growth-rates (seats per movement) were discounted (forecast as zero) in 2011. Neither GTAA nor TC appear to understand what is occurring.
4. Annual airport capacities were intentionally under-calculated by both TC and GTAA in 2008 by 25% for both 5 and 6 runways. Both parties knew then to be false in 2011.
5. KPMG is requested to recalculate airport capacities but do not do so. They simply accept a GTAA planning number as capacity in 2016. TC endorse the report Feb.2020.
6. The GTAA falsify their 2017 capacity calculations, failing to include their new capabilities for average hourly movements, as outlined on pp.46-49 of their 2017 Master Plan.
7. Annual movement capacities although revised, were intentionally under-calculated again in 2016-2017 by both parties.
8. GTAA's gate planning numbers clearly show the false airport movement forecasts.
9. Information provided in annual GTAA reports to Durham Region contains consistently false data and conclusions. e.g., see Appendix 7.p19 above and pp. 31-33 following.
10. Historical Aircraft load factors indicate they are increasing faster than GTAA/TC's go to population growth model. This airport growth model is false. GTAA fail to adequately report this, as is required by the GTAA Ground lease para. 9.01.07.
11. Price Waterhouse Coopers and KPMG, contractors to GTAA, fail to understand the full scope of their duties and fail to diligently report to the “Landlord” (Minister of Transport, Canada) as required by GTAA Ground lease Article /Section 9.02 within their 5 year recurring Performance Reviews of the GTAA. See Appendix 1 above for link to full document.

Appendix 8: Report DS-22-64: Re amending 1997 Operating and Option Agreement for the Oshawa Executive Airport

Report DS-22-64 to Oshawa Development Service Committee meeting of March 7, 2022. [Mar 7 DSC see pp.83-91. https://calendar.oshawa.ca/meetings/Detail/2022-03-07-1330-Development-Services-Committee-Meeting2/930afb7e-2b8f-4da9-b1f7-aefb01503bf8](https://calendar.oshawa.ca/meetings/Detail/2022-03-07-1330-Development-Services-Committee-Meeting2/930afb7e-2b8f-4da9-b1f7-aefb01503bf8)

Excerpts (bold added)

Para 2.1

“Transport Canada be requested to amend the 1997 Operating and Option Agreement for the Oshawa Executive Airport to remove said lands from the area subject to the agreement.”

Para 5.1

“significant concerns with airport noise”

Para 5.3

“formally requesting the removal of the South Field and East Airport Accessible Trail lands from the agreement on the basis that the City’s financial contribution to the Airport **operating budget totalling \$2.2 million** and the City’s financial contribution to the Airport **capital budget totalling \$7.5 million** over the 2017-2021”

Comments

- Total deficit **9.7 million** being 2.2 operating and 7.5 million capital.
- Not previously reported, although requested multiple times over the years at airport meetings and directly from S. Wilcox, airport manager; Mayor Carter; and via the Oshawa Board of Trade.

Para 5.4

“Federal Government be requested to implement a number of amendments to the 1997 Agreement.”

“The City should request an **increase in the percentage** of the proceeds to which it is entitled under the 1997 Agreement for the period between 2033 and 2047 as set out above.”

“...**uncertainty associated with Pickering** – the City runs the risk of making an investment only to lose it in the event that the Federal Government **opens Pickering** and Oshawa’s Airport becomes redundant.

Comments

- An increase in the percentage of the proceeds actually translates into a 14-year reduction shortening of the Agreement, from 2047 to 2033.
- Commissioner Munro has claimed that Pickering will open in 2033 and 2036.
- He repeats Durham Region’s **incorrect assumption of Toronto capacity**.

Appendix 9: Oshawa Airport Business Plan, 2015-2019

Excerpts (pp. 73, 76)

Projected Expenses	2015 (\$)	2016 (\$)	2017 (\$)	2018 (\$)	2019 (\$)
Airport Expense - Avgas	550,000	650,000	975,000	1,300,000	1,560,000
Airport Expense - Jet Fuel	588,000	750,000	1,500,000	2,000,000	2,500,000
Management contract	698,500	712,470	726,719	741,254	756,079
Airport Operating Expenses	170,900	174,318	177,804	181,360	184,988
CBSA After Hours Service	0	4,000	4,000	4,000	4,000
Terminal Operating Expense	122,000	124,440	126,929	129,467	132,057
Total Projected Expenses	2,129,400	2,415,228	3,510,453	4,356,082	5,137,123

Summary	2015 (\$)	2016 (\$)	2017 (\$)	2018 (\$)	2019 (\$)
Total Projected Income from Airport Fees	1,807,200	2,114,054	3,360,325	4,323,215	5,219,510
Total Projected Expenses	2,129,400	2,415,228	3,510,453	4,356,082	5,137,123
Net Airport Operating Budget	(322,200)	(301,174)	(126,227)	(8,966)	82,387
Contribution to Airport Capital Reserve	150,000	150,000	250,000	250,000	250,000
Total Airport Budget	(472,200)	(451,174)	(376,227)	(258,966)	(167,613)

Note: In 2014, \$1.5 million in property tax was paid on airport land with the City of Oshawa retaining just over \$500,000.

Capital Reserve Contributions and Withdrawals	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2030	2033
Opening Balance	(730,000)	(580,000)	(4,924,500)	(4,343,500)	(3,454,500)	(3,415,000)	(3,597,000)	(715,000)
Land Sales	0	0	388,000	704,000	1,108,000	0	0	0
20 Year Capital Recommendations	0	(4,494,500)	(57,000)	(65,000)	(1,318,500)	(432,000)	(118,000)	0
Infrastructure Contribution from Operating Budget	150,000	150,000	250,000	250,000	250,000	250,000	3,000,000	990,000
Year End Balance	(580,000)	(4,924,500)	(4,343,500)	(3,454,500)	(3,415,000)	(3,597,000)	(715,000)	275,000

(Document no longer on the web but available on request. The 2008 Plan is available.)

Cont'd

Excerpts:- Oshawa Airport Business Plan 2015-2019. Cont.

Excerpt

March 2014 from

WSP Canada Inc. 311 Goderich Street P.O. Box 1600 Port Elgin, Ontario, Canada N0H 2C0 Tel: 519-389-4343 x 233 Fax: 519-389-4728 www.wspgroup.co

As part of Oshawa Airport Business Plan 2015-2019

Item	Description	Estimated Capital Costs																	
		2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029	2030	
1.0	Runways																		
1.1	Runway 12-33			\$2,130,000															
1.2	Runway 05-23																		
2.0	Taxiways																		
2.1	Taxiway Alpha		\$81,000																
2.2	Taxiway Bravo			\$1,052,000															
2.3	Taxiway Charlie North																		
2.4	Taxiway Charlie Mid				\$57,000														
2.5	Taxiway Charlie South																		
2.6	Taxiway Delta		\$223,500																
3.0	Aprons																		
3.1	Apron I			\$853,000															
3.2	Apron II Tie-Downs							\$432,000											
3.3	Apron II City 15- Hangar Area																		
4.0	Approach Lighting																		
4.1	Runway 12 RIL																		
4.2	Runway 12 PAPI							\$30,500											
4.3	Runway 30 RIL																		
4.4	Runway 30 PAPI																		
4.5	Runway 05 RIL																		
4.6	Runway 05 PAPI																		
4.7	Runway 23 RIL							\$17,500											
4.8	Runway 23 PAPI							\$30,500											
5.0	Runway Edgelighting																		
5.1	Runway 12-33							\$470,000											
5.2	Runway 05-23							\$330,500											
6.0	Taxiway Edgelighting																		
6.1	Taxiway Alpha							\$12,500											
6.2	Taxiway Bravo							\$218,000											
6.3	Taxiway Charlie							\$11,500										\$118,000	
6.4	Taxiway Delta							\$46,000											
7.0	Apron Edgelighting																		
7.1	Apron I							\$15,500											
8.0	FEC Building																		
9.0	Future Development																		
9.1	Proposed South Access Route			\$50,000															
9.2	FEC Fencing Replacement		\$18,000																
9.3	LOC Area Fencing Replacement					\$65,000													
9.0	TOTAL	\$0	\$300,500	\$4,194,000	\$57,000	\$65,000	\$1,318,500	\$432,000	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$118,000	

Comment

This is the source document for the material on the preceding page. ON TIME and ON Budget it was not. The debt far exceeds the budget and the deficit of \$10 M.

Appendix 10: Report DS-22-67: Proposed Noise Abatement Procedures for the Oshawa Executive Airport

Report DS-22-67 to Development Service Committee meeting of March 7, 2022 (p. 204)
<https://pub-oshawa.escribemeetings.com/filestream.ashx?DocumentId=8312>

Excerpt

Table 6.2 - Final Proposed Noise Abatement Procedures	
No.	Final Proposed Noise Abatement Procedure
602.105(a) Preferential Runways	
1	Overnight Preferential Runways: Between the hours of 9:30 PM and 7:30 AM, consideration should be given to using Runway 12 for arrivals and Runway 30 for departures, consistent with safety of operations.
2	Tower Open Preferential Runways: Aircraft will use Runway 30 when the winds are from a heading of 210° (incrementally) to 030° at up to 5 kts.
602.105(c) Hours When Aircraft Operations are Prohibited or Restricted	
3	Overnight Restricted Hours: Between the hours of 9:30 PM and 7:30 AM, only police, medical and industrial emergency flights are permitted to arrive at and depart from the Airport. Airport tenants with aircraft based at the Airport are permitted to arrive between the hours described above, but are not permitted to depart, independent from police, medical, and industrial emergency flights.
4	Overnight Engine Run-Ups: Scheduled engine run-ups associated with aircraft maintenance are prohibited from 9:30 PM to 7:30 AM.
602.105(e) Departure Procedures	
5	Departure Turns: Departing aircraft will continue to fly on the runway heading until they reach 1,000 ft. ASL before making any turns.
602.105(g) Prohibition or Restriction of Training Flights	
6	Time of Day Flight Training Restrictions: Flight training aircraft are not permitted to depart Friday-Monday before 8:00 AM and after 4:00 PM May 1 – September 30; and Friday-Monday before 8:00 AM and after 8:00 PM October 1 – April 30.
7	Alternating Seasonal Weekend Flight Training Restrictions: Flight training is not permitted on the 1st and 3rd Sunday of the month and 2nd and 4th Saturday of the month from May 1 – September 30.
8	Statutory Holiday Flight Training Restrictions: Flight training is not permitted on the following federal statutory holidays: New Year's Day; Good Friday; Victoria Day; Canada Day; Labour Day; National Day for Truth and Reconciliation; Thanksgiving Day; Remembrance Day; Christmas Day; and Boxing Day.
9	Circuit Restrictions: A maximum of 4 aircraft are permitted in the circuit for training purposes for any runway at any given time.

Cont'd

(Appendix 10: Report DS-22-67: Proposed Noise Abatement Procedures for the Oshawa Executive Airport. Cont'd)

Comments

1. Other than Items # 2, 4, and 5 above, **Oshawa had no agreement** with the aviation community.
2. Appendix A, of DS-22-67 Implementation process (found on p.194, items 4-11) reveals the consequences of failures of aviation consensus. See: Proposed Noise Abatement Procedures for the Oshawa Executive Airport. pp. 175-241.
3. **No documentation of the objections** was included within this report DS-22-67. The objections are significant. The report is incomplete without them, particularly in light of the comments provided by Transport Canada staff. Transport Canada will be making the preliminary recommendations.
4. **No other aviation professional group agreed with Oshawa's recommendations, other than #s 2, 4, and 5.**

Further, within the documentation and discussion, **no other airport was provided as an example of a full hard nighttime closure.** All examples that were provided have a permission system whereby the airport manager can waive the closure due to unusual circumstances. **Oshawa intends to provide no relief.**

*I suggest that the Minister would not accept this responsibility, now or in the future. Given this report, I suggest he would be loath to assign that duty to this Oshawa airport manager. Oshawa deals with pilots of reduced experience **and aircraft cannot stop in the air.***


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(Appendix 10: Report DS-22-67: Proposed Noise Abatement Procedures for the Oshawa Executive Airport. Cont'd)

5. Acoustic report Project21325.00 Oshawa Airport Canadian Flight Academy for Weintraug Erskine Huang LLP Toronto by Nicholas Sylvestre-Williams, M.ENG., P. ENG. Nov 16 2021 was not included or provided for this public discussion.

Excerpt/ Comment

The flight school NEF contours remain on the airport property.



Appendix 11: 1997 Operating and Option Agreement for the Oshawa Executive Airport

Excerpts

“THIS AGREEMENT made as of the 21st day of March, 1997”

<https://www.oshawa.ca/en/transportation-parking/resources/Documents/Oshawa-Operating-Options-Agreement.pdf>

2.01.01 The Airport Operator undertakes,to continuously, actively, diligently and carefully manage, operate. and maintain the Airport, as an Aerodrome open to the public, in accordance with this Agreement and the Aeronautics Act, R.S.C. 1985, c, A-2. and Regulations made thereunder.

2.01.02

c)...the Airport Operator shall remain liable to Her Majesty in respect of its obligations hereunder.

2.01.05 Notwithstanding any provision contained in this agreement... the Airport Operator shall not enter into any ... agreements that have a term exceeding twenty years in total including options to renew or extensions, without the prior written consent of Her Majesty, which may be unreasonably withheld.

3.02.03. If the Airport Operator wishes to cease Airport Operations for any reason other than the Decision to Open the Pickering Airport or the actual opening of the Pickering Airport, then the Airport Operator may sell the Airport Assets (the "Regular Sale") in accordance with the provisions herein and allocate the proceeds of sale in accordance with the provisions of subsection 3 07 or the Airport Operator may request that Her Majesty exercise her Option to Purchase provided it first gives notice.

3.02.04. :.....if the Airport Operator is in default ... then Her Majesty may exercise Her Option to Purchase.

3.03.01. If the Airport Operator gives Notice... to cease Airport Operations, Her Majesty shall have an Option to Purchase ...In accordance with Schedule "B.

Schedule A

Legal Description of Airport Lands ...

Schedule B

4.01.01. If ... the Airport Operator no longer intends to continuously actively and diligently manage operate and maintain on the Airport Lands a certified airport, (registered aerodrome) open to the public, the Airport Operator shall give Notice to the Minister in accordance with ... 3.02.01 of this Agreement.



Cont'd

(Appendix 11: 1997 Operating and Option Agreement
for the Oshawa Executive Airport, cont'd)

Excerpt

Schedule C (p. 31)

<u>Years</u>	<u>% of Net Regular Proceeds</u>	
	<u>Airport Operator</u>	<u>Her Majesty</u>
1 - 5	0%	100%
6 - 10	0%	100%
11 - 15	0%	100%
16 - 20	0%	100%
21 - 25	8%	92%
26 - 30	12%	88%
31 - 35	18%	82%
36 - 40	28%	72%
41 - 45	42%	58%
46 - 50	65%	35%
51 onward	100%	0%

Mar. 1997-2023=26 years
=~ 12% maybe

Does Oshawa own the airport? No it does not.

<https://www.oshawa.ca/en/transportation-parking/resources/Documents/Oshawa-Operating-Options-Agreement.pdf>

Cont'd


Appendix 12: Enhanced index Durham GTAA meetings request # 2022-010

Table 1					
Doc. No.	General Description	Page. Numbers	Release yes/no/partial	Slides or??	Video / Speaker
Dept. Corporate Services, Legislative Services					
1	Planning & Economic Development Committee Minutes dated April 10, 2012 pg 2-4	1-19	All below yes	No/no - toby Lennox speaks Advises H Eng arrival questions slides yes not in minutes	Na
2	Planning & Economic Development Committee Minutes dated April 9, 2013 Pg 2-3	20-29		No/no Toby Lennox speaks - uses powerpoint .pt not shown questions slides yes not in minutes	Na
2014 nothing					
3	Planning & Economic Development Committee Minutes dated January 6, 2015 page 5-6	30-56		No/no H Marshal L Mckee lan Clarke Power point presentation not shown in minutes Mckee " YZ at capacity 2030-2032 Pickering reqd. 2027-2037	noaudio video See actual nasPI
4	Report from Commissioner of Planning and Economic Development dated November 10, 2015	57-74		Unusual...Have submission...Urban studies for GTAA/ Growth/ connectivity and Capacity also avail on gtaa web site slides yes not in minutes	Note H ENG makes "no runway build for 20 years" May 2017
5	Committee of the Whole Minutes dated December 7, 2016	75-130		No No .. Year of the Hubs report and it is referenced lan Clark and L Mckee.. "Copy of presentation provided to the clerk" minutes page 5 item 3.3. _ _ not delivered	No audio video
6	Regional Council of Durham Minutes dated November 8, 2017	131-151			
7	Greater Toronto Airports Authority presentation dated November 8, 2017	152-169		H Marshall and her presentation on page 5 of 21 item #2. Slide 12 says "protects the 6th runway"	No audio video. Confirm that

Nov. 8, 2017: Rep. H. Marshall advises Council that the GTAA "protects the 6th runway."

Cont'd

(Appendix 12: Enhanced index Durham GTAA meetings request # 2022-010, cont'd)

4	<p>Committee Minutes dated January 6, 2015 page 5-6</p> <p>Report from Commissioner of Planning and Economic Development dated November 10, 2015</p>	57-74	<p>Mckee Ian Clarke Power point presentation not shown in minutes Mckee " YZ at capacity 2030-2032 Pickering reqd. 2027-2037</p> <p>Unusual...Have submission..Urban studies for GTAA/ Growth/ connectivity and Capacity also avail on gtaa web site slides yes not in minutes</p>	Note H ENG makes "no runway build for 20 years" May 2015
5	Committee of the Whole Minutes dated December 7, 2016	75-130	No No .. Year of the Hubs report and it is referenced Ian Clark and L Mckee.."Copy of presentation provided to the clerk" minutes page 5 item3.3. _— not delivered	No audio video
6	Regional Council of Durham Minutes dated November 8, 2017	131-151		
7	Greater Toronto Airports Authority presentation dated November 8, 2017	152-169	H Marshall and her presentation on page 5 of 21 item #2. Slide 12 says "protects the 6th runway"	No audio video. Confirm that
8	Committee of the Whole Minutes dated June 6, 2018 min and video part1	170-247	Minute —??Airport in Pickering?	Van T and Mckee. 00:29:50 to 33.00 "can not cope" see bio
9	Greater Toronto Airports Authority presentation (June 4, 2019)	248-258	Presentation	Van T and Mckee. Start 00: 01:29 questions 9:31-33:46
10	Planning & Economic Development Committee Minutes dated June 4, 2019	259-271	Minutes Page 2 of 13 item #4 "expected to cope 85 m pas by 2037	"We have no Plans for new runways". At 16:36 mark 
11	Regional Council Minutes dated October 28, 2020	272-322		
12	2020 GTAA to Durham Regional Council (October 28, 2020)	323-333	Presentation	
13	2021 GTAA Annual Update Durham Region (November 2, 2021)	334-343	Presentation	
14	Planning & Economic Development Committee Minutes dated November 2, 2021	344-351	Minutes	Van T & Flint:... 36:00 to 1:12:12
	For video/ Web streaming see "Durham Region live streaming"	Should be part of historian meetings/ agendas/minutes with hyperlinking as per Oshawa		Ap 11 2022

June 4, 2019: GTAA's rep. Johan van 't Hof advises Council: "no plans for new runways"

Appendix 13: Video Clips from GTAA 2014/15 AGM, and GTAA Presentations to Durham Regional Council, June 6, 2018 and June 4, 2019

(Selecting the images below will initiate the link to a video recording)



#1 GTAA AGM 2014/15 AGM

Howard Eng GTAA CEO on the timing of Pearsons 6th runway(aka 4th E/W runway).

This is a 1min 10 sec extract of an existing You Tube video is most important for providing an understanding of the future capacity issues at Toronto International Airport.



#2 GTAA report to Durham Region Council, June 6, 2018

GTAA board member Johan van 't Hof. "My personal answer...we cannot cope...We... would have no concerns about an airport constructed in Pickering...[outlines various types]...Toronto airport is gonna become a Heathrow where we're gonna have to take bigger planes, 300 seats, 350 seats, just to get the bodies through because our runways are limited...so we need other airports..."



#3 GTAA to Durham Region Council, June 4, 2019

Q: "There's talk of Pearson being built out... so it'd be, like, room for two more...runways so can you kind of confirm that, or...?"

A: [GTAA rep Johan van 't Hof]: "No, I can confirm...we have no plans for new runways."

Comment

This directly contradicts the GTAA's current Master Plan (see Appendix 2).

Appendix 14: Video Clip of Oshawa Council Meeting, June 25, 2012



4 “In June 2012 council decided that it would not proceed with the runway extension and that the development of a new Business Plan based on the current runway length be undertaken” (p.16) Oshawa Airport Business Plan 2015-2019.

The Mayor of Oshawa, John Henry, questioning Doug Thomson, a community representative delegation about a conversation they had "on Friday" [presumably June 22, 2012].

In this conversation, Mr Thomson recalled that Mr Henry was convinced that the community had not realized that they would be inundated with 100,000 training flights a year. Mr Thomson replied that he tried to convince the Mayor that "we [the community] do know that, and we are aware of it."

That Oshawa Airport Business Plan 2015-2019, now pronounced as “unacceptable” in council, outlined (pp.16 and 17) the series of decisions to limit runway length to 4000’ vs the proposed 5000, to limit scheduled airline operations, (source of federal funding) and to be a flight training operation of 100,000 training flights per year.

Oshawa based training flights currently number about 33,000 annual movements.
(p. 19) Hm Proposed noise Abatement Procedures Public Consultation Materials Final Report Sept 27, 2021.

(Copies available on request.)

Appendix 15: Municipalities Can Make Use of GTAA By-Law No. 2...



....to call GTAA to account..

...and Invite Transport Minister.

SECTION 11 - AD HOC MEETINGS BETWEEN THE CORPORATION, GOVERNMENT NOMINATORS AND MUNICIPAL NOMINATORS

11.1. Nominators Meeting

The Corporation shall, at the request of any Government Nominator, Municipal Nominator or Named Community Nominator convene a meeting between the Corporation and the authorized representative of each of the Government Nominators, Municipal Nominators or Named Community Nominators, or such other person as the Government Nominator, Municipal Nominator or Named Community Nominator, as applicable, may select, to respond to questions on matters of public interest concerning the Corporation's business. The Government Nominator, Municipal Nominator or Named Community Nominator, as applicable, shall state in its request the general nature of the business to be discussed at the meeting. The Corporation shall ensure that the Chair and such other Directors and officers of the Corporation are present at the meeting.

Approved by TC July 14, 2017

-20-

Appendix 16: Sundry other material

Some video links


Link 1 you tube video Toronto real Capacity the math of capacity. Explained 6 min.

Link 2 you tube video Toronto "Capacity" explained. Act 1 a tragedy early history 11 min.

Toronto "Capacity" terminated. Act 2 v2. Sequence of events 12 min.

Toronto "Capacity" replaced. Act 3 V2 Solution to the issue. 12 min.

There is no rail to Resolute.



The screenshot shows a news article from the Hamilton region. The article title is "New Pickering Airport could serve a variety of uses". It is dated Monday, March 09, 2020. The article discusses a KPMG report on the future of the Pickering lands, suggesting a modern 21st-century airport. A red arrow points to a highlighted sentence: "the Greater Toronto Area (GTA) needs a new airport in 2036. In the past 20 years, international air travel for Canadian airports has more than doubled (up 108 per cent)." The article also lists services the airport could provide, such as passenger air service and aviation-related services.

New Pickering Airport could serve a variety of uses

Posted on Monday, March 09, 2020 [Back to Search](#)

Whitby, Ont. – A review of the KPMG Aviation Sector report on the future of the Pickering lands once again makes a strong case for the development of a modern, 21st century airport; designed to meet growing demand in the eastern Greater Toronto Area (GTA) and Ontario, as a whole.

"We have an opportunity to make Canada's newest airport a model of sustainability; built with renewable materials and a shared space that supports our agricultural community," said John Henry, Regional Chair and Chief Executive Officer. "This is our chance to show leadership, creating an airport that is designed with the smallest possible carbon footprint and the biggest possible impact on our economy and quality of life."

Last week, Transport Canada released its KPMG Aviation Sector Analysis, which confirmed that **the Greater Toronto Area (GTA) needs a new airport in 2036.** In the past 20 years, international air travel for Canadian airports has more than doubled (up 108 per cent).


The report recommended that the Pickering Airport Lands could be used for services, such as:


- **Passenger airport:** Allowing air carriers to provide domestic point-to-point air service (travel within Canada), since domestic passenger traffic for all Canadian airports grew by 53 per cent from 2000 to 2015.
- **Aviation-related services:** Airports provide connectivity, which means they attract

CONT'd

Appendix 16: Sundry other material cont'd

Toronto layout and the 6th runway GTAA 2008-30 master Plan





5.2.7 Capacity of the Existing Airside System

The airside capacity of Toronto Pearson is determined to a large extent by factors outside the control of the GTAA. For example, the airside capacities presented in this chapter are based upon current Transport Canada regulations and Nav Canada air navigation technology and practices. Should regulatory, technological or procedural changes occur in the future, the airside capacities reflected in this Master Plan may need to be re-examined.

A capacity coverage chart is a tool commonly used to quantify the overall capacity of an airport's airside system. The capacity coverage chart reflecting the existing five-runway system at Toronto Pearson is shown in Figure 5-3. The chart illustrates the hourly capacities available at the Airport under different wind and weather situations

(plotted on the vertical axis) and the percentage of time each is typically available (plotted on the horizontal axis).

The capacity coverage chart for Toronto Pearson includes four main types of runway operations, as described in the following sections.

East/West Runway Operations – Visual Meteorological Conditions: The first type of runway operation corresponds to the simultaneous use of the Airport's three east/west


runways under visual meteorological conditions (VMC), when the weather is such that pilots can make visual reference to the ground for navigational purposes.

Runways 06L-24R and 06R-24L do not have sufficient separation between them to permit independent operations. As a result, arrivals are assigned to one of the runways and departures to the other. For both noise mitigation and operational reasons, arrivals are assigned to the outer runway



Aircraft taxiing to Runway 06L via Taxiway Delta adjacent to Etobicoke Creek

Appendix 16: Sundry other material



(06R-24L) and departures are assigned to the inner runway (06L-24R). Runway 05-23 is sufficiently separated from the southern runway complex to be operated independently, serving a mixture of arrivals and departures.

This type of runway operation is shown in Figure 5-4. Aircraft need to fly into the wind when landing and taking off. As a result, the first diagram applies to a westerly wind situation with arrivals on Runways 23 and 24L, and departures on Runways 23 and 24R. The second diagram applies to an easterly wind situation with arrivals on Runways 05 and 06R, and departures on Runways 05 and 06L.


Through GTAA computer simulations, it was determined that based

on the anticipated aircraft fleet mix at Toronto Pearson and a balanced demand of arrivals and departures, this type of operation has a capacity of approximately 126 aircraft movements per hour, including 56 operations on Runway 05-23 and 70 operations on the closely spaced parallel runways, Runways 06L-24R and 06R-24L. This capacity exceeds current demand levels at Toronto Pearson. An analysis of weather data suggests that this type of operation tends to be available approximately 79 per cent of the time.

East/West Runway Operations – Instrument Meteorological Conditions: The second type of operation also corresponds to the use of the three east/west runways in the same manner, but under

instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) that occur when visibility is such that instrumentation, rather than visual reference, is required for navigation. Under these conditions, larger separations between aircraft are required compared to the separations applied under visual meteorological conditions.

Based on GTAA computer simulations, the capacity of the three east/west runways decreases to approximately 108 aircraft movements per



Aircraft taxiing to departure runway

Appendix 16: Sundry other material cont'd




FIGURE 5-5 NORTH/SOUTH RUNWAY OPERATIONS

 Primary Arrival and Departure Runways  Arrival Off-load Runway

hour during instrument meteorological conditions, including 48 operations on Runway 05-23 and 60 operations on the closely spaced parallel Runways 06L-24R and 06R-24L. This type of operation tends to occur approximately 14 per cent of the time.

Since using the east/west runways offers the highest capacity, these first two types of operations are preferred during peak time periods. However, since demand does not currently require the simultaneous use of all three east/west runways on a regular basis, air traffic control sometimes utilizes only two of the east/west runways, resulting in a lower capacity than presented in the capacity coverage chart.

Given that the purpose of the capacity coverage chart is to quantify the maximum capacity available under given wind and weather conditions, it is not necessary to reflect these lower capacity configurations in the chart. As air traffic demand grows over time, the frequency of using all three east/west runways simultaneously will increase toward the values given in the capacity coverage chart.

North/South Runway Operations: The third type of operation reflected in the capacity coverage chart pertains to the use of the north/south runways when strong cross-wind conditions preclude the use of the east/west runways. Similar to Runways 06L-24R and 06R-24L, Runways 15L-33R and

15R-33L do not have sufficient separation to permit independent operations. As a result, arrivals are assigned to one runway and departures to the other. Arrivals, which require less runway length than departures, are typically assigned to 15R-33L, the shorter runway, and departures are typically assigned to 15L-33R, the longer runway. Under this type of operation, it is not uncommon for arrivals of heavier aircraft to be off-loaded onto 15L-33R to provide a longer landing distance.

The resulting north/south runway operation is shown in Figure 5-5. The first diagram shows the operations that would occur under strong north wind conditions with 33L being used as the primary

Appendix 16: Sundry other material cont'd

A Critical Review of Noise Exposure Forecast (NEF) Contours and the Efficacy as a Tool for Land Use Planning Yue Wu University of Windsor




Figure 21: Unique complaints map in 2017 with NEF contours and NMT locations

[A Critical Review of Noise Exposure Forecast \(NEF\) Contours and the Efficacy as a Tool for Land Use Planning](#) Yue Wu University of Windsor contours 25,30,35,40 see fig.9

There is no noise in Toronto. Contours 25-40.
But superimpose this on Pickering plan.....

End04232022 ib

<https://youtu.be/O3dMbeLph28>.Video this report to this point.

Other additional material

GTAA annual report 2008

<https://www.torontop Pearson.com/-/media/project/pearson/content/corporate/who-we-are/pdfs/annual-reports/2008-minutes-from-the-airport-min.pdf?modified=20190328154712>

The deposits to the debt service coverage fund, and the operations and maintenance fund were largely as projected.

None of the variances to the 2008 Business Plan discussed above was of a nature that caused the GTAA to take specific corrective actions.

D) SUMMARY OF THE FIVE-YEAR BUSINESS PLAN

The five-year Business Plan (2009 to 2013) is based on assumptions underlying the GTAA's assessment of various external factors. During 2009, the GTAA will be focused on managing the expected downturn in Airport activity caused by the slowing economy. This will include a careful review of operating expenses, continued focus on maximizing non-aeronautical revenue opportunities, incentives for new airline activity and a five dollar increase in the AIF for originating passengers. The connecting passenger AIF remains unchanged. Certain capital projects have also been deferred in response to the anticipated reduction in passenger demand.

The economic and operating assumptions for 2009 include:

- Inflation as measured by the CPI index of 2.0%;
- 30.3 million total passengers;
- Landed MTOW of 11.8 million tonnes; and
- 18.9 million landed seats.

Future capital development at the Airport includes the completion of the Terminal 3 Redevelopment project, the Terminal 3 Master Plan and the Post-ADP development project. These projects have been approved by the GTAA Board of Directors. The GTAA also anticipates spending approximately \$35.0 million per year on operations, maintenance and restoration capital projects in 2008 and approximately \$50.0 million per year for the balance of the Business Plan period. In addition to these expenditures, the GTAA has identified a number of projects that are anticipated to be required to meet growing passenger demand. These airport development projects total \$678.5 million over the forecast period. The timing and amount of these expenditures are subject to change as demand and operating conditions evolve and plans are finalized.

Over the forecast horizon, the primary drivers for the GTAA's Business Plan are the long-term growth in Airport activity and inflation. Specific revenue or cost containment initiatives carried out over this period may also impact revenues and expenses. The forecast average annual passenger growth rate from 2009 to 2013 is 2.3%. Aircraft movements and landed MTOW are expected to grow at a 4.6% and a 4.3% rate, respectively.

Movement increase 4.6%=

Auditor report and sign off to annual report

AUDITORS' REPORT

To the Board of Directors of the Greater Toronto Airports Authority

We have audited the balance sheets of the Greater Toronto Airports Authority as at December 31, 2008 and 2007 and the statements of operations, changes in net assets (deficiency) and cash flows for the years then ended. These financial statements are the responsibility of the Greater Toronto Airports Authority's management. Our responsibility is to express an opinion on these financial statements based on our audits.

We conducted our audits in accordance with Canadian generally accepted auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform an audit to obtain reasonable assurance whether the financial statements are free of material misstatement. An audit includes examining, on a test basis, evidence supporting the amounts and disclosures in the financial statements. An audit also includes assessing the accounting principles used and significant estimates made by management, as well as evaluating the overall financial statement presentation.

In our opinion, these financial statements present fairly, in all material respects, the financial position of the Greater Toronto Airports Authority as at December 31, 2008 and 2007 and the results of its operations, changes in its net assets (deficiency) and its cash flows for the years then ended in accordance with Canadian generally accepted accounting principles.


PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP

Chartered Accountants, Licensed Public Accountants

Toronto, Ontario

March 11, 2009

Flight activity is measured by aircraft movements. The type and size of aircraft using the Airport determines the MTOW and the number of seats. These measures are used to calculate airline charges for each flight. Total movements in 2008 increased by 1.2%, from 425,500 in 2007 to 430,588. MTOW for 2008 was 13.4 million tonnes, as compared to 13.2 million tonnes in 2007, an increase of 2.1%. Total arrived seats increased 2.7% from 20.3 million in 2007 to 20.8 million in 2008. During the past several years airlines have been adjusting their fleet mixes and flight schedules in order to improve their financial performance, resulting in airline load factors, or the ratio of passengers to seats, steadily increasing. Reduced air travel demand in the latter part of 2008 and as projected for 2009 as a result of the slowing economy has caused many airlines to reduce capacity through reduced schedules and changes in aircraft type utilized on certain routes. This is expected to keep airline load factors high despite the anticipated slowing in demand which will have a negative effect on MTOW and arrived seats. It is expected that air carriers will continue to engage in these capacity management techniques for the foreseeable future. The following graph illustrates the arrived seats, MTOW and movements (in thousands) for the past three years, by quarter:



In November 2006, the Government of Canada announced its “Blue Sky” policy whereby the federal government intends to proactively pursue opportunities to negotiate more liberalized agreements for international scheduled air transportation. Since that time a number of agreements have been put into place, including an agreement with the European Union. This policy initiative is expected to provide increased opportunities for passenger and cargo service to be added at Toronto Pearson as market demand warrants, although some legacy agreements continue to restrict open access to Toronto Pearson.

Page 35 above—

“Total movements in 2008 increased from 2007 by 1.2%, from 425,500 in 2007 to 430,588.”

Calculation

Forecast 2013-(430,588*1.046=**450,395**. Based on Actual # 2008 **not 520,000 of the 2008 master plan**

“The forecast average annual passenger growth rate from 2009 to 2013 is 2.3%. Aircraft movements and landed MTOW are expected to grow at a 4.6% and a 4.3% rate, respectively”. p 103.

NOTE aircraft movements are not annual” as per remarks a year(2009) later... : as below

“The forecast average annual passenger growth rate from **2010 to 2014** is 3.6%. Aircraft movements are expected to grow at an average 3.6% rate over the forecast period while landed MTOW is expected to grow by 2.3% over the same period” p107 My red highlighting

Actual numbers c file statistical reviews/Pearson estimates over time

2013 431,300. **About 19,000 short ~ growth~ 0.2%**

2014 433,000

2015. 444,000

2016. 456,400

2017. 465.4T

2018...473.T

2019 452.8T

2020. 174.4

2021 173.0

There is a need to request that GTAA amend reportingreturn to providing Movement forecast and delivering the results of previous forecast and differences analysis.

		0.01	Sum	1%	4.6%	~21%	0.2
						Growth rate required	Growth rate achieved
				1.01 multiplier	1.046	1.208	1.002
	430,588	4306	434894	434,893.88	450,395.048	520,000	431300
	Actual in 2013		431,300		450395	Diff	19095
	2007-2008						1.012
	actual 2007		425,500				430588

Responsibility

As per GTAA ground lease ... section 9. And is the legalized version in contract of the PAP.
PWC. Section 9 had this additional duty.

Section 9.02	Performance Review
9.02.01	On or before the fifth (5th) anniversary of the Date of Commencement and on or before the end of every fifth anniversary thereafter (it being the intent of this Section that not more than five (5) years shall have elapsed between reviews), the Tenant shall cause a review to be conducted and completed of its management, operation and financial performance since the last review or from the Date of Commencement if it is the first review.
9.02.02	Such review shall be conducted by a competent Person who is independent of and at Arm's Length with the Tenant and who is qualified to conduct such a review of the management, operation and financial performance of the Tenant.
9.02.03	The Tenant shall ensure that the Person conducting the review shall prepare a written report containing his findings.
9.02.04	The Tenant shall ensure that the Person conducting the review shall include in the report at least the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none">(a) the terms of reference of the review;(b) statements stating the extent to which the Tenant has been and is operating<ul style="list-style-type: none">(i) a safe and efficient service to the public; and(ii) an efficiently run undertaking in accordance with the Tenant's business plans and approved objects;(c) statements stating the extent to which financial and management controls, information systems and management practices have been and are maintained, including the steps taken to ensure that<ul style="list-style-type: none">(i) the assets of the Tenant have been safeguarded and controlled;(ii) the financial, human and physical resources of the Tenant have been managed economically and efficiently; and(iii) the operations of the Tenant have been carried out effectively;(d) any further information that is reasonably required by any Nominator or by a majority of the Board;

	(e) any concerns or qualifications that the Person conducting the review has with respect to any matter described in this Section; and	
	(f) any other relevant information about the Tenant.	
9.02.05	Subject to Subsection 9.02.06, the Tenant shall, within three months of the commencement of the review, provide a copy, free of charge, of any report referred to in Subsection 9.02.03 to the Landlord, and shall within the same period, provide a copy of such report and a summary of the report, excluding commercially confidential material or private personnel information, to each Nominator.	Minister Transport Canada
9.02.06	If issues arise during the course of the review which prevent it being concluded within the three month period referred to in Subsection 9.02.05, the Tenant shall cause an interim report to be prepared and provided in accordance with this Section within the three (3) month period referred to in Subsection 9.02.05 and the Tenant shall provide a final report in accordance with this Section not later than six (6) months after the commencement of the review.	Issues arising requires a Interim report
9.02.07	The Tenant shall, on request, provide to any member of the public a copy of the summary of any interim report or of any final report, excluding commercially confidential material or private personnel information.	Public gets summary only
9.02.08	The Tenant shall cause further reviews to be conducted pursuant to this Section when requested to do so by the Board or by a majority of the Nominators.	
9.02.09	At the request of any Nominator the Tenant shall convene a meeting of its Board with the Person conducting the review and with the other Nominators in order to determine the course of action to be taken to resolve any problems disclosed by the report.	ANY Nominator

Who is/was the entity responsible for these reviews/reports to the minister?

Has anyone within Durham staff ever commented on the discrepancy between the 2008 master plan and the annual report of the same year.

RE: 9.02.05 did you ever receive such a report.

Were you advised of this discrepancy noted above and if so what were the findings of any "issues" report in accordance with 9.02.06. and or 9.02.08 or 9.02.09.

And

Will you provide a copy of any such documents?

I have read the Summaries of the last 20 years and there. Is no mention of these dual forecasts.

What are we talking about here?

Past Performance review dates

Nov 15 2001 deloitte unsigned

October 2006 PWC

July 2011 PWC

Sept 2016 PWC. Unsigned

Nov 26 2021 KPMG Partner and Managing Director, KPMG Corporate Finance Inc.

rsimm@kpmg.ca Richard Simm 416-777-8437

Ground lease... actions required of corporation and auditor above and beyond requirements of the Not for profit corporations act

(e) provide the annual report contemplated in Subsection 9.01.07 to each of the Nominators and to the Minister prior to the public meeting and, on request, to any member of the public.

9.01.07 The Tenant shall, prior to each public meeting to be held pursuant to Subsection 9.01.05, publish an annual report in respect of the Lease Year (in this Subsection 9.01.07 called "that Lease Year") immediately preceding the Lease Year in which the public meeting is held which shall, as a minimum:

(a) include the audited annual financial statements of the Tenant for that Lease Year, the Tenant's Auditor's report on such Tenant's audited annual financial statements, and a summary of the Tenant's affairs for that Lease Year;

(b) contain a report on the Tenant's performance relating to the Tenant's business plan and objectives established for that Lease Year, and as applicable for the previous five Lease Years;

(c) include an explanation by the Tenant of all variances and corrective actions taken with respect to the Tenant's performance described in Paragraph 9.01.07(b);

(d) present a summary of the Tenant's business plan for the then current Lease Year and the Tenant's business plan containing a forecast for the next five Lease Years, including specific objectives, (measurable where feasible), for such summary and forecast and relating to the approved objects of the Tenant;

(e) contain a report on the remuneration provided to each Board member and on the salary of each of the senior officers of the Tenant;

(f) contain a report on compliance or non-compliance with the Tenant's Code of Conduct; and

(g) report on all contracts in excess of an amount obtained by multiplying seventy-five thousand (\$75,000) dollars by the C.P.I. Adjustment Factor for that Lease Year which are entered into during that Lease Year and which contracts were not awarded on the basis of a public competitive tendering process and such report shall identify the parties to the contract, the amount of the contract, the nature of the contract, the circumstances of the contract and the reasons for not awarding such contract on the basis of a public competitive tendering process.




KPMG liability search. P 367,p239, p019

KPMG and WSP’s procedures consisted solely of inquiry, comparison and analysis of identified and provided information and relevant information from third-party sources. **The team relied on information provided by project participants without verification or audit.** The information contained in this document does not constitute an audit. Accordingly, KPMG and WSP do not express an opinion on such matters.

This document should be considered in its entirety, and in conjunction with the other three reports that comprise the Pickering Lands Aviation Sector Analysis. These reports provided many of the assumptions upon which the analysis contained in this report is based. Selection of, or reliance on, specific portions of this document could result in the misinterpretation of comments and analysis provided. **KPMG and WSP will not assume any liability** in connection with the reliance by any third party on this document.

KPMG and WSP reserve the right, **but will be under no obligation, to review all findings, conclusions and calculations included or referred to herein** and, if KPMG and WSP consider it necessary, to revise the findings, conclusions and calculations in light of any information that becomes known to KPMG and WSP after the date of this document.



Airport Development Timelines

- Failure to undertake the development of the Pickering airport amounts to a de facto acceptance of the status quo
- A planning and construction period of 15 years indicates 2032 as the earliest for start of service, but likely could well be much later based on experience for the Western Sydney airport
- Losses expected to increase year over year as demand rises over and above regional airport capacity (+3% per year)
- Early planning can also help mitigate noise impacts on communities

2019
2024
2027
2032

AECOM

Info report#2018-INFO-97
 June 1 2018
 Prepared by:

AECOM Canada Ltd.
 300 Water Street
 Whitby, ON L1N 9J2
 Canada

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Date: May 30, 2018
 Project #: 60562615

Slide

Text

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2019
2024
2027
2032

In addition to the timelines required for airport development, there are additional factors which underline the importance of a federal announcement for Pickering airport in the near future.

Durham white paper June1 2018.

“7. Conclusion and Next Steps

- 7.1 The GTA is among the fastest growing large metropolitan regions in North America, yet its airport network is underdeveloped. **The federal government should commit to proceeding with an airport in Pickering, based on all of the past and ongoing studies that have identified the need for an airport.** A sustainable and innovative airport development in Pickering would provide the required additional capacity within close proximity to downtown Toronto and dramatically improve global connectivity of the GTA east. “

Delivered 6 months after GTAA 2017 master plan and 3 weeks after gtaa 2017 annual report.. it was out of date on delivery.

Signed by

Angela Gibson Director, Corporate Policy and Strategic Initiatives

Garry H. Cubitt, M.S.W. Chief Administrative Officer

From: Ivan Battye [REDACTED]
Subject: Re: Aviation in Southern Ontario/Pickering/Oshawa
Date: November 25, 2022 at 10:55 AM
To: OMAR ALGHABRA omar.alghabra@parl.gc.ca, francois-philippe.champagne@parl.gc.ca, marco.mendicino@parl.gc.ca, infomedia@oag-bvg.gc.ca
Cc: Ryan Turnbull, MP Ryan.Turnbull@parl.gc.ca

Dear Sirs and madam
Yesterday I sent two letters to you.
The original email was a single letter with a large attachment.
That document caused failures of transmission. Apparently due to size.
In resurrecting the two letters the covering letter reverted to a draft. My mistake..
Please find below the correct letter.
The second email with the attachments is unchanged.
I apologize for the inconvenience
Sincerely,
Ivan Battye

November 24, 2022
The Honourable Omar Alghabra Minister of Transport House of Commons
Ottawa, Ontario Canada K1A 0A6 omar.alghabra@parl.gc.ca Telephone: 613-992-1301

The Honourable Francois-Philippe Champagne
Minister of Innovation, Science and Economic Development House of Commons
Ottawa, Ontario Canada K1A 0A6 francois-philippe.champagne@parl.gc.ca Telephone: 613-995-4895

The Honourable Marco Mendicino
Minister of Public Safety House of Commons
Ottawa, Ontario Canada K1A 0A6 marco.mendicino@parl.gc.ca Telephone: 613-992-6361

Karen Hogan, FCPA, FCA Office of Auditor General of Canada
240 Sparks Street Ottawa, Ontario Canada K1A 0G6 infomedia@oag-bvg.gc.ca 613-954-8042

Dear Sirs and Madam:

Re: The ongoing critical issue of GTAA/Pickering. I am including the other Ministers as above. The issues are historical, recurring, and increasing in magnitude.

This is my fourth letter to your office on the subject. The last letter, Feb 20, 2018, included Minister Bains. His department's response from Ms. Francis McRae in Feb. 24, 2018 appears to have precipitated or at the least, coincided with the sudden departure of GTAA's Selma M. Lussenburg, Vice President Governance, Corporate Safety & Security, General Counsel and Corporate Secretary. No reply was received from your office that would suggest otherwise.

Attached are two documents to be sent to Durham Region Council outlining the public misinformation being provided by GTAA and Transport Canada staff on an ongoing basis. I was hopeful that the Lussenburg discipline and your more recent and welcome comments in the attached Appendix# 3, would have persuaded GTAA and TC senior staff to improve upon their past public behaviour. Sadly, this has not been the case as indicated by your "National Summit on the Recovery of the Air Sector" scheduled for Nov. 24, 2022, which I believe signals some recognition of the issues you have before you.

By now, two submissions, as noted in my attachments, with regard to Oshawa Airport may have come to your attention. With respect, I am concerned, as illustrated in these two attachments, with any guidance from your staff that might recommend approval of both Oshawa's requests. I believe this may be unwise and underestimate the significant risks that you may need to address both politically and pragmatically. Additional concern relates to the fact that there was no real public process for either document.

The attached appendices clearly indicate is that Oshawa staff have cleverly "hoisted" the Region, GTAA and Transport "on a long petard" of your own making. These fraudulent failures of oversight appear to have been constructed assiduously by your department's neglect, false and misleading information.

The 50 year old fiction of a requisite Pickering Airport now needs to be relinquished and is long past due. I look to you to bring this to an honourable closure.

Recently, as attached, JOHAN C. VAN 'T HOF, GTAA director, from Pickering, delivered the following comment on June

4, 2019 to Durham Council in their GTAA annual briefing and in response to a direct question:-
"We have no plans for new runways." (See Appendix 13 Sound Byte #3)

The GTAA 2017-37 MasterPlan references this, (See Appendix 2) "... a sixth runway...we will continue to protect the necessary land and zoning,...and we expect that additional airside capacity will be required at some point."

This Code of Conduct issue should require "forthwith removal" (GTAA Ground Lease Article 9, Section .01.02.). Also see [GTAA Code of Business Conduct and Ethics](#) (Section 2.2 and various). The GTAA CEO appears to believe his 2018 remarks,(See Appendix 13 Sound Byte #2) the year previous, were acceptable. I disagree. Both remarks, as demonstrated in the two Sound Bytes, require at a minimum, a very public retraction. I ask for your intervention to restore truth and public trust.

I believe Mr. Van't Hof's' demeanour was most unprofessional and unethical. He would seem to be taking his view from your approved KPMG study that Durham Region has interpreted falsely as "Toronto needs a new airport in 2036". That KPMG Supply and Demand Report should be withdrawn. In the interests of restoring a transparent and honest communication with the public, I ask that you do so and advise Durham Council that their statement regarding 2036 is false and is a non-existent myth. Durham should review and withdraw their statement, accordingly.

This ongoing deception of the truth can no longer be permitted to persist. There appears no indication that your office oversight has any GTAA regulatory effect.

You will see in the attachments that I am asking Durham Region to exercise their privilege of calling the GTAA to a public accounting. I request your support in this matter in order that there be a region based, full and frank discussion. I hope that you attend.

Would you please advise me of your conclusions and recommendations on these matters.

Ivan R.S. Battye
AA 79314 (QMA 955)
[REDACTED]
100 Muir Cres., Whitby On.
L1P 1B6